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I. THE RECORD ON APPEAL DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW BY MODIFYING THE CHILD CUSTODY PROVISION OF 
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THE DIVORCE DECREE AND AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE 
CHILDREN TO MR. HANSON. 
The arguments presented by Mr. Hanson neither rebut nor 
address the issues raised on appeal.  Instead, without due regard 
to established case law and the attendant legal principles to be 
utilized in guiding child custody determinations, he attempts to 
simply argue that the trial court=s decision amounts to the best 
interests of the children.  Nevertheless, the record on appeal 
demonstrates that the trial court not only abused its discretion 
but erred as a matter of law in the course of its child custody 
determination. 
A. The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing 
to Give Considerable Weight to the Primary Caregiver 
Factor. 
 
This Court, in Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990), articulated a number of factors to be considered by the 
trial court in performing the best-interests-of-the-child analysis 
prior to making a child custody determination: 
The need for stability in custodial relationship 
and environment; maintaining an existing primary 
custodial bond; the relative strength of parental 
bonds[;] [t]he relative abilities of the parents 
to provide care, supervision, and a suitable 
environment for the children and to meet the needs 
of the children; [p]reference of a child able to 
evaluate the custody question; [t]he benefits of 
keeping siblings together, enabling sibling bonds 
to form; [t]he character and emotional stability 
of the custodian; and [t]he desire for custody; 
the apparent commitment of the proposed custodian 
to parenting. 
Id. at 54 (citations omitted).1  While the trial court may consider 
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many factors in the course of its best-interests-of-the- child 
analysis, each is not on equal footing.  Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 
UT App 290, &26, 989 P.2d 491.  Generally, the trial court 
possesses the discretion to determine, based on the specific facts 
before it and within the constructs established by the appellate 
courts, where a particular factor falls within the spectrum of 
relevant importance and its appropriate weight.  See Davis v. 
Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988); Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 
942, 945 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 
1999).  However, the importance of the multitude of factors used 
in determining a child=s best interests Aranges from the possibly 
relevant to the critically important.@  Hudema, 1999 UT App 290 at 
&26.  AAt the critically important end of the spectrum, when the 
child is thriving, happy, and well-adjusted, lies continuity of 
placement.@  Id. (citing Davis, 749 P.2d at 648 (AIn considering 
competing claims to custody between fit parents under the >best 
interests of the child= standard, considerable weight should be 
given to which parent has been the child=s primary caregiver.@); 
Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (A[T]rial 
courts must examine a child=s need for stability, and therefore, 
consider prior custody arrangements, and the potential harm to the 
child if the arrangement is changed.@). 
 In this case, the trial court erred as a matter of law by 
failing to give considerable weight to the primary caregiver 
factor.  This is demonstrated by the trial court=s Memorandum 
Decision, in which it stated the following: 
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Mr. Peterson[, the custody evaluator,] found that 
[Ms. Hanson] had been the >children=s primary care 
giver= and she appears to do a good job of meeting 
their basic needs.@  However, the Court does not 
put much weight on the determination that [Ms. 
Hanson] is the primary care giver because her 
being in Louisiana necessitates this fact. 
 
(R. 448, &34). This statement, while demonstrating the trial 
court=s failure, as a matter of law, to duly consider Ms. Hanson=s 
status as the primary caregiver, also inaccurately portrayed Ms. 
Hanson solely as the primary caregiver while residing in 
Louisiana.  At the time to trial, Ms. Hanson had been the primary 
caregiver for essentially the children=s entire lives, not to 
mention since the divorce in October 2001 (R. 45, &2).   
 Further guidance is provided in Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 
(Utah 1989), where the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
 
Nevertheless, if an existing custody 
arrangement is not inimical to the child, the 
continuity and stability of the arrangement are 
factors to be weighed in determining a child=s 
best interests. What particular weight to be 
accorded those factors in a given case must 
depend on the duration of the initial custody 
arrangement, the age of the child, the nature 
of the relationship that has developed between 
the child and the custodial and noncustodial 
parents, and how well the child is thriving 
physically, mentally, and emotionally. A very 
short custody arrangement of a few months, even 
if nurturing to some extent, is not entitled to 
as much weight as a similar arrangement of 
substantial duration.  Of course, a lengthy 
custody arrangement in which a child has 
thrived ought rarely, if at all, to be 
disturbed, and then only if the circumstances 
are compelling.2 
Id. at 604 (citation omitted and emphasis added). In addition to 
Elmer, other Utah Supreme Court cases dictate that stability is a 
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fundamental consideration in original custody awards as well as 
subsequent modifications. For example, in Pusey v. Pusey, 728  
P.2d 117 (Utah 1986), the Court stated that decisive factors in 
child custody determinations should be function related, and 
include the Aidentity of the primary caretaker during the 
marriage.@ Id. at 120. The Court in Pusey also stated that another 
factor to be considered is the Aidentity of the parent with whom 
the child has spent most of his or her time pending custody 
determination if that period is lengthy.@ Id.  
 Another example evincing the importance of the primary 
caregiver factor is found in Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 
1988), where the father had custody of the child for over a year 
prior to trial on the issue of permanent custody.  The trial court 
considered a number of factors, including the stable environment 
provided by the father, and that he had been the primary caretaker 
during the interim period.  In the course of affirming the custody 
award to the father, the Utah Supreme Court stated, AIn 
considering competing claims to custody between fit parents under 
the >best interests of the child= standard, considerable weight 
should be given to which parent has been the child=s primary 
caregiver.@  Id. at 648 (emphasis added).  
 The trial court, in the case at bar, stated that it did Anot 
put much weight on the determination that [Ms. Hanson] is the 
primary care giver because her being in Louisiana necessitates 
this fact.@ (R. 448, &34). As demonstrated by the record, the 
trial court explicitly disregarded the undisputed facts that the 
  8 
children had resided with Ms. Hanson for well over five years 
prior to the custody trial, that the children progressed well in 
the Louisiana environment (R. 599:96-97; R. 599:97:13-20).  The 
record also demonstrates that the trial court basically ignored 
not only the factor of stability, and discounted, if not ignored, 
the potential harm to the children that would result if a change 
in the lengthy custody arrangement with their mother occurred (R. 
599:83:15-21; 599:104:7-11). 
In the course of trial, on direct examination by Mr. Hanson=s 
counsel, Mr. Peterson, the custody evaluator, testified as 
follows: 
I do not feel that there is sufficient 
justification to say - grant dad custody.  They 
have a very significant bond with their mother. 
 She=s a good mother.  She=s responsible and I 
can=t for the life of me in weighing each one of 
their strengths or weaknesses say that based on 
parenting skills alone that dad would be the 
preferable parent.  Dad was a very good parent 
too.  He=s had some problems in the past. He=s 
grown up a lot in the last few years, he=s really 
matured and the children have become much more 
of a priority to him. 
 
(R. 599:83:15-24).  In addition, he testified that the children 
are Ahappy and well adjusted in their mother=s home@ and that he 
would not recommend removing the children from their mother=s 
custody inasmuch as Athey would be stressed.@ (R. 599:97:13-15; R. 
599:104:7-11). 
In fact, in response to questioning performed by the district 
court, itself, concerning the possible removal of the children 
from their mother, Mr. Peterson adamantly testified, AWell, I 
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would not remove the children from their mother.  I=m opposed to 
that.  So I=m not talking about leaving mom in Louisiana and 
  
having the kids come here.  I do not support that.@ (R. 
599:112:111-12). 
Perhaps even more telling is the failure of Mr. Hanson to 
even mention in his Brief this Court=s case of Larsen v. Larsen, 
888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), a case that is eerily similar 
to the case at bar.  In Larsen, father and mother were divorced 
after nine years of marriage and three children, with mother 
receiving by way of stipulated settlement custody of the children. 
 Id. at 721.  Shortly after the divorce, mother decided to move 
with the children to Oregon where she intended to marry her 
fiancé.  Id.  Father filed a petition to modify custody because he 
believed that the move would inhibit his relationship with the 
children, disrupt the children=s religious training, and remove 
them from their family and friends.  Id.  The trial court granted 
the petition, ordering that if mother moved from Summit County, 
Utah, physical custody of the children would transfer to father.  
Id. at 721-22.  On appeal, this Court reversed the trial court=s 
modification, concluding that there was not compelling evidence 
that residing in Summit County would be better for the children 
than allowing them to continue to reside with their life-long 
primary caregiver.  Id. at 723, 727. 
Similar to Larsen, the trial court in the instant case 
determined that the children should be removed from the custody of 
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their mother and placed in their father=s custody if, and only if, 
their mother were to reside Ain Salt Lake County, or a nearby 
county within reasonable distance (less than 150 miles)@ of their 
father=s residence.  Based on the trial court=s analysis and 
findings, the court=s ruling basically means that the it believed 
the children=s domicile in Salt Lake County is so essential to 
their welfare that not residing there would be more detrimental 
than separating them from their life-long primary caregiver.  In 
light of the previously mentioned case law, statutory law, and 
legal principles, the record on appeal is devoid of a compelling 
reason why residing in Salt Lake County or thereabouts would be 
better for the children than allowing them to reside with their 
life-long primary caregiver where they undisputedly thrived and 
flourished. 
The trial court, in the course of its ruling, focused on the 
children being in close proximity to extended family in Utah.  
While this factor is an appropriate factor for the court=s 
consideration, Athis, by  itself, is insufficient to disturb a 
previously established custody arrangement in which the children 
are happy and well-adjusted.@  Id. at 726.  In fact, according to 
Utah case law, this factor, on the spectrum of relevant and 
important factors, is at the less significant end of the spectrum. 
See Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, &36, 989 P.2d 491.  
As in Larsen, it is undisputed that Mr. Hanson is and can 
continue to be a positive factor in the children=s lives. 
Addressing this, the evaluator stated that sharing longer blocks 
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of time together,3 in contrast to more frequent visitation, could 
facilitate relationships between Mr. Hanson and the children. 
B. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by 
Failing to Enter Specific, Detailed Findings 
Supporting its Child Custody Determination. 
Besides what appear to be broad generalizations, Mr. Hanson 
fails to address how the trial court=s analysis and findings in 
this case are defective in several respects. There is essentially 
no reference by the trial court to the evaluator=s adamant 
recommendation and insistence that the children not be removed 
from their mother.  The trial court=s findings also failed to 
consider undisputed evidence of the children=s Avery significant 
bond with their mother@, Ms. Hanson=s lengthy status as the primary 
caregiver, and the evidence that the children thrived while living 
with their mother in Louisiana.  These omissions constitute an 
abuse of discretion.4 
The trial court also ignored Mr. Peterson=s warnings of the 
negative impact to the children if they were removed from their 
mother.  In fact, the expert testimony of Mr. Peterson as well as 
his recommendation expressly preponderated in favor of continuing 
custody at the very least with Ms. Hanson in some fashion or 
another.  The trial court gave little of no explanation for its 
refusal to follow this recommendation.  A[A]lthough the trial 
court is not bound to accept the evaluation [of the court 
appointed evaluator], . . . some reason for rejecting the 
recommendation . . . is in order.@  Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 
925-26 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Tuckey v. Tuckey, 649 P.2d 
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88, 91 (Utah 1982)).  Contrary to the assertions of Mr. Hanson, 
the record demonstrates that the court=s disregard of the need for 
consistency and stability, especially given the rather even 
parenting abilities, constitutes an improper application of the 
law and a resulting abuse of discretion. 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
previously filed Brief of Appellant, Ms. Hanson respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the trial court=s modification 
ruling and remand the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings consistent with the Court=s opinion, including a 
reconsideration of her request for reasonable attorney fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31st day of August, 2009. 
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
 
 
 
________________________ 
Scott L Wiggins 
Counsel for Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
 
No Addendum is utilized pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
